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Summary 
Lecture audiences and students were asked to respond to virtual decision and game 
situations at gametheory.tau.ac.il. Several thousand observations were collected and the 
response time for each answer was recorded. There were significant differences in 
response time across responses. It is suggested that choices made instinctively, that is, 
on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that 
require the use of cognitive reasoning. 
 
Keywords: Response Times, Instinctive and Cognitive, Reasoning, Experimental Game 
Theory 
 
JEL Classification: C9 
 
 
This work could not have been done without the collaboration of Eli Zvuluny who built 
the site http://gametheory.tau.ac.il which served as the platform for the experiments. I 
would like to thank Michael Ornstein who served as my research assistant for this 
project and provided good advice. I would also like to thank Gur Huberman; the idea to 
record response times came to us while working on a different unfinished project. 
This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Economic Theory and 
Experimental Economics" jointly organised by SET (Center for advanced Studies in 
Economic Theory, University of Milano-Bicocca) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 
Italy, Milan, 20-23 November 2005. The Workshop was co-sponsored by CISEPS 









Address for correspondence: 
 
Ariel Rubinstein 
School of Economics 
Tel Aviv University 
Tel Aviv 69978 
Israel 
Phone: +972 3 640 9601  
E-mail: rariel@post.tau.ac.il 1. Introduction
There is growing interest among economists in the bounds on the rationality of economic
agents. Economists are increasingly abandoning the “economic man” paradigm and instead are
using models that reflect what they consider to be more realistic descriptions of the way in
which human beings make decisions. One can identify three approaches in the literature to
“opening the black box” of decision making:
Bounded Rationality
This approach is based on casual observations of the way in which people deliberate (and
primarily of our own decision making processes). These are used to construct abstract models
which are intended to increase our understanding of the effect of certain decision-procedural
elements on the outcome of an economic interaction (see Rubinstein (1998)) . Thus, for
example, we add an assumption to the standard model of the repeated game such that players
consider not only their standard game payoff but also the complexity of their strategies. The
inclusion of complexity considerations in these models is based on our intuition about the
meaning of complexity in long term strategic situations. However, the choice of the actual
complexity measures has not been linked to any empirical findings.
Behavioral Economics
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky launched a project which not only refuted the
standard use of the economic man paradigm but also identified psychological elements which
are systematically used by decision makers. Their findings demonstrated the involvement of
emotions and procedural elements which were missing from the standard application of
rationality in economics . The findings of the “Kahanman and Tversky” school, as well as the
feeling that traditional models had been exhausted, led in the nineties to the establishment of
the field of “Behavioral Economics”. Researchers in this field usually preserve the assumption
that the economic agent is rational in the economic sense of maximizing a well defined target
function; however, they do not feel obliged to define the target as material rewards. Agents in
these models maximize a utility function which also reflects psychological motives like care,
envy and reciprocity.
Note that for the most part behavioral economics does not relate to the procedural elements
3of decision making. (For exceptions see, for example, Selten (1978) which presents three
levels of reasoning and Rubinstein (1988) which, following Tversky’s work on similarity,
analyzed a procedure for constructing similarity-based preferences between vectors.)
Modeling the interaction between agents who do not behave as utility maximizers requires the
invention of new notions of equilibrium (see, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1998)).
Brain Studies
Following the advances in brain research and especially the increased accessibility of
machines using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), some researchers have started
monitoring brain activity during decision making (for an introduction to the field see, for
example, Glimcher(2003)). Subjects make a decisions or play a game inside the machine.
researchers look for correlations between the choices made and the activity in various brain
centers which are responsible for certain functions (such as expressing emotions or executing
cognitive operations). However, this is an expensive and speculative type of research. The
technical constraints result in small samples and noisy date and the interpretation of the
findings is far from indisputable.
Brain studies attempt to make inferences about our “black box” from brain activity, but one
could think of more obvious physical indicators of the way in which people reason. Previous
research in game theory and decision making used information about the way in which
subjects respond to game situations in order to draw conclusions about their deliberation
algorithm. In particular, see Camerer, Johnson, Rymon and Sen (1993) who used the order of
mouse clicks to demonstrate that people analyze an extensive game forwards rather than
backwards as implicitly assumed by standard game theoretical solution concepts.
The basic idea of the current research project is to explore the deliberation process of
decision makers based on their response times. Measuring response times is quite common in
psychology (see for example Luce, 1986 and Kosinski (2005)). In simple time response
experiments, there is only one stimulus and the response time from the moment of its
appearance is measured. In symbol or tone recognition, the subject responds when he
recognizes a certain stimulus from among a set of symbols which appear in front of him. In
choice experiments, the subject chooses the correct response to a given stimulus. Experiments
typically employ 20 people doing a task 100-200 times. The unit of time response in these
experiments is milliseconds and the typical response time is less than one second.
4Very few experimental papers in game theory have reported responses times (one
exception is Wilcox (1993)). The problem with measuring response time in economic
decisions is the huge variation in results. Most experiments in economics and game theory are
done with small samples (for an exception, see Guth, Schmidt and Sutter (2003)). Measuring
time response using such samples is meaningless. It is a rare opportunity when a large
population becomes available.
Such an opportunity presented itself with the inauguration of the site
http://gametheory.tau.ac.il which I built together with Eli Zvuluny. The purpose of the site was
“to provide the teacher of a basic course in Game Theory with a free user-friendly didactic tool
for conducting web-based thought experiments.” Teachers assign their students “pre-class”
problems which are virtual games (see Rubinstein (1999) for a description of the teaching
method used by the site). The site was launched in January 2001. During the period it has been
in operation, almost 100 teachers from 25 countries have actively used it. Most of the users are
from departments of economics although some are from computer science, political science,
business or law. Almost 5000 students have participated in at least one experiment. Most of
the students responded to questions in English but a few responded in Finnish, French,
Portuguese, Russian, Slovak and Spanish.
A few months after its launch, the site was modified in order to record the subject’s
response time (RT). Response time is defined here as the number of seconds between the
moment that our server receives the request for a problem until the moment that an answer is
returned to the server. Subjects were not informed that RT is being recorded.
A further opportunity to collect data on a large scale arose as part of a public lecture which
I have delivered nine times during the period May 2002-February 2004. The lecture, entitled
“John Nash, Beautiful Mind and Game Theory”, described my personal encounter with John
Nash, introduced the basic ideas of Game Theory with a critique and discussed the book and
the movie. The audience (mostly students and faculty) were approached prior to the lecture and
asked to respond to several questions via the site http://gametheory.tau.ac.il. Response time
was recorded in seven of the universities: the Technion (Israel); Tilburg University (Holland);
the London School of Economics (UK); the University of British Columbia and York
University (Canada); Georgetown University (USA); and Sabanci University (Turkey). About
2500 subjects responded, thus creating a huge database.
In what follows, I present the more interesting results of the research. In most cases, there
5were huge differences in the time response distributions of the various choices made. Often
one distribution lies completely to the right of another (first order stochastic domination) and I
will interpret such a configuration as evidence that it requires more response time time.
I will try to explain the differences by categorizing the actions as either
(1) Cognitive: an action which involves a reasoning process,
(2) Instinctive: an action which involves instinct,
or
(3) Reasonless: an action which is likely an outcome of a process involving little or no
reasoning.
It is the claim of this paper that choices which require more cognitive activity will result in
longer response times than choices which involve an instinctive response.
The obvious question is how to classify an action as cognitive, instinctive or reasonless. I
do it intuitively . It will be seen that when the classification is intuitively clear, the response
time of an instinctive action is significantly shorter than that of a cognitive action. In some
cases the classification is not as clear and large response time differences provide a hint as to
which is the instinctive action.
I hope that at the very least the results will demonstrate the potential usefulness of time
response as a means of shedding light on the meaning of actions in decision and game
situations.
2. Results: Matrix Games
We begin with two examples of matrix games:
Example 1: A Zero Sum Game (#15):
Subjects were asked to play the following virtual matrix game (in the role of the row
player) against an anonymous opponent:
LR
T 2,−20 , 0
B 0,0 1,−1
6The question did not specify what the numbers mean. If the subjects interpret them as
vNM utilities then the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predicts that the action T will
be chosen with probability 1/3. However, note that as long as the subjects prefer a higher
payoff, Nash equilibrium predicts that the proportion of subjects who play T will be less than
that who play B.
2029 students in 54 courses responded to the question: 63% of them chose the action T,t h e
one which Nash equilibrium predicts will be chosen less frequently.
As shown in the table and Figure 1 demonstrate, the response time of those who chose T
was shorter than those who chose B.T h e median response time (MRT) of the subjects
choosing B was 50s which was much higher than the MRT for T w h i c hw a so n l y3 7 s.T h e
graphs of the cumulative distributions of response time for those who chose T is clearly (first
order) stochastically dominated by the corresponding graph for B.
In this case it appears that T is the instinctive action since the player is triggered to go after
the larger payoff. Playing B, the action predicted to be more common in Nash equilibrium,
requires more reasoning. For example, it might result from the player’s expectation that his
opponent is not likely to play L in order to avoid the risk of a large loss and thus it is better for
him to play B.
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Figure 1
Example 2: Successive Elimination of Strategies (#4)
Subjects were asked to play the following two-player game as the row player:
ABCD
A 5,2 2,6 1,4 0,4
B 0,0 3,2 2,1 1,1
C 7,0 2,2 1,5 5,1
D 9,5 1,3 0,2 4,8
The sample included 2543 subjects in 76 courses and the results are summarized in the
table and in Figure 2. The response time of A is very low, but the small number of subjects
who chose A makes it difficult to draw conclusions in this case. Each of the other three
choices was selected by about 800 subjects. It appears that the action B required about double
the time of actions C and D.
In this case, I would identify the instinctive responses as C and D - the action D because it
contains “9” which is the highest payoff in the matrix and the action C because the average
payoff for the row is the highest in the matrix. The dominated action A seems to be reasonless.
8Some reasoning is needed to choose B which is the only survivor of successive elimination of
strongly dominated strategies (the elimination order is 2A,1 A  D,2 D,1 C,1 C,2 C). Thus, the
action B appears to be the one which requires the most cognitive reasoning.
Note that C was chosen in somewhat less time than D. This casts doubt on the assumption
made in the literature that subjects follow only a few steps of the successive elimination
process. The action D is eliminated before C and thus one expects the RT for D to be below
that of C which in fact was not the case.
Total 100% 2543 96
Action %# median
A 3% 82 64s
B 32% 822 161s
C 33% 843 76s
D 31% 796 83s
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93. Results: The Traveler’s Dilemma, the Beauty Contest and the Centipede Game
We now discuss the results of three problems which are often used to demonstrate the
tension between clear-cut game theoretic analysis based on serial inductive thinking and the
vagaries of actual behavior.
Example 3. The Traveler’s Dilemma (#53)
Imagine you are one of the players in the following two-player game:
- Each of the players chooses an amount between $180 and $300.
- Both players are paid the lower of the two chosen amounts.
- Five dollars are transferred from the player who chose the larger amount to the player who
chose the smaller one.
- In the case that both players choose the same amount, they both receive that amount and no
transfer is made
What is your choice?
This game was suggested in Basu (1994). Assuming that the players care only about their
final dollar payoff, the only equilibrium strategy of this game is 180. The following table and
Figure 3 summarize the choices of 2985 individuals who attended the Nash lectures and 1573
students in various courses. (Note that the distribution of answers is similar to that of the 50
answers reported in Goheree and Holt (2001) for experiments with real payoffs).
Strikingly, the response time for the range 295 − 299 is the longest while the response
times for 300 and the range 181 − 294 were the shortest.
The response 300 seems to be the instinctive action while the choices involving more
cognitive reasoning are in the range 295 − 299 (following an argument of the type “he will
choose 300 and therefore I will choose 299” or “he will choose 299 and therefore I will choose
298”, etc.). The answers 181 − 294 appear to be arbitrary and are probably the results of a
random “pick a number” algorithm. The classification of the Nash equilibrium action, i.e. 180,
is more difficult. For some it might have been the outcome of a non-trivial reasoning process
10while for others it might have been the result of prior knowledge of the game.
Goeheree and Holt NashLectures MRT Courses MRT
n 50 2985 77 1573 88
180 8% 13% 87s 20% 99s
181 − 294 18% 14% 70s 17% 79s
295 − 299 24% 17% 96s 16% 118s
300 50% 55% 72s 46% 80s












0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210
180 181_294 295_299 300
Figure 3
Note that the results for the Nash lecture audiences differ from those of the students in
classes with more subjects in the lecture audiences choosing the “game theoretic solution”.
Furthermore, the response time distributions of the two groups also differ. However, what is
important for our purposes is the relative size of the time responses which is similar in the two
11populations. Thus, the actions which seem to require the most cognitive reasoning, i.e., those
in the range 295 − 299, clearly have the highest RT. The instinctive response of 300 has a
similar time response distribution to that of responses in the range 181 − 194 which appears to
be the result of “pick a number”.
Example 4: The Beauty Contest Game (#1)
Each of the students in your class must choose an integer between 0 and 100 in order to
guess“2/3 of the average of the responses given by all students in the class”.
Each student who guesses 2/3 of the average of all responses rounded up to the nearest
integer, will receive a prize to be announced by your teacher (or alternatively will have the
satisfaction of being right!).
What is your guess?
The Beauty contest game is another game in which the depth of reasoning was considered
by some to be the source of differences in behavior. Successive elimination of dominated
strategies eliminates all actions besides 0 or 1; combinations of these two actions are consistent
with the Nash equilibria of the game. The game has been heavily experimented (see, for
example, Nagel (1995)). The average guess of 2423 subjects in 66 courses was 36.2 which is
very close to the number Nagel obtained.
I divide the results into three categories: Category A consists of the responses 33 − 34 and
22, which seem to be the result of a clear process of reasoning such as: “The average will be 50
and therefore I will choose a number close to 2/3 ∗ 50  33.3” or an iteration of this argument.
Category C consists of responses of 50 or more which seem to indicate misunderstanding of
the game. Category B consists of the “victims of Game Theory” who gave the Nash
equilibrium and the subjects who followed “a best response to a wild guess”.
The results are summarized in the table and in Figure 4. Clearly those who chose an action
in class A thought for a longer time than the others. Those who made choices in C thought for a
much shorter time.
12n  2423 0 − 12 − 13 14 − 15 16 − 21 22 23 − 32 33 − 34 35 − 49 50 51 − 100
86s 11% 9% 2% 6% 4% 10% 11% 11% 16% 20%
269 213 47 137 99 249 262 267 393 487
A 15% 126s 157s 113s
B 49% 89s 91s 89s 84s 82s 84s 94s
C 36% 70s 70s 70s
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The results cast doubt on the classification used by Nagel and others in which the whole
range of 20 − 25 is classified as one group. In my data, the MRT of the 4% who chose “22”
was 157s while the MRT among the 8% who chose 20, 21, 23, 24 or 25 was only 80s. This
must mean that there is little in common between the choice of 22 and the rest of the class
which Nagel called “Step 2”.
13Example 5: The Centipede Game (#33 )
You are playing the following "game" with an anonymous person. Each of the players has
an "account" with an initial balance of $0. At each stage, one of the players (in alternating
order - you start) has the right to stop the game.
If it is your turn to stop the game and you choose not to, your account is debited by $1 and
your opponent’s is credited by $3.
Each time your opponent has the opportunity to stop the game and chooses not to, your
account is credited by $3 and his is debited by $1.
If both players choose not to stop the game for 100 turns, the game ends and each player
receives the balance in his account (which is $200; check this in order to verify that you
understand the game).
At which turn (between 1 and 100) do you plan to stop the game? (If you plan not to stop
the game at any point write 101).
The centipede game is another prime example of the tension between Nash equilibrium and
the way that players actually play. Assuming that the players care only about the amount in
their own account, the only Nash equilibrium strategy for player 1 is to stop the game at turn 1.
However, this is a highly unintuitive action. The response 101 seems to be the instinctive one.
The cognitive actions are in the upper range of the spectrum 98,99,100. A choice in the
range 2 − 97 seems to be a reasonless one.
The results are summarized in the table and in Figure 5 and once again appear to
demonstrate the correlation between time response and whether a choice is cognitive,
instinctive or reasonless.
n  1361 1 2 − 97 98 − 100 101
% 12% 11% 20% 57%
median 132s 80s 163s 123s
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4. Results: The Ultimatum Game
Following the work of Werner Guth, much experimental work in game theory has been
done on the ultimatum game:
Example 6: The Ultimatum Game - the Proposer (#23)
Imagine that you and a person you do not know are to share $100.
You must make an offer as to how to split the $100 between the two of you and he must
either accept or reject your offer. In the case that he rejects the offer, neither of you will get
anything.
What is your offer ?
I offer the following amount to the other person (if he agrees I will get the rest):____
15It is customary to assume that each player is only interested in attaining as much money as
possible. Applying the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium concept, we usually say that “game
theory predicts” that the proposer will offer either $1 or nothing to the responder who will
accept the offer. Of course, this is unrealistic. In real life, the proposer often cares about the
amount of money he offers the other player, perhaps feeling guilty for exploiting his preferred
status, or perhaps he is afraid that the responder might be insulted by too low an offer and
would prefer to get nothing rather than agreeing to an “insultingly low offer”.
The distribution of responses for the 9 Nash lecture audiences was quite uniform (and
demonstrated some systematic gender differences according to which females made higher
offers on average). The results for 3202 subjects in 6 Nash lectures are presented in the table
and in Figure 6 alongside the statistics for the responses of 1426 students in 46 courses:
In this case, distinguishing between the different actions is not straightforward. In
particular, it is unclear whether the instinctive action in this case is the 50:50 split or the one in
which the proposer demands almost the entire sum. We can look to response time for further
clues. The MRT of those who offered less than $50 was 25% higher than of those who offered
an equal split, thus supporting the hypothesis that the equal split is the instinctive action for
many of the subjects.
Answer Nash Lectures MRT Courses MRT
3202 49s 1426 41s
0 − 1 15% 55s 15% 53s
2 − 25 9% 56s 8% 48s
26 − 49 11% 52s 16% 45s
50 47% 43s 44% 36s
51 − 60 11% 55s 8% 42s
61 − 100 8% 46s 9% 39s
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Figure 6
There is a group of not insignificant size within the Nash lecture audiences who offered the
other player more than $50. The low MRT of those who offered 61 or more supports the view
that these choices were the outcome of misunderstanding the question. However, the MRT of
responses in the range 51 − 60 was different from that of responses in the range 40 − 49 and
thus it is not clear whether these responses were intentional or an outcome of error.
After responding to this question, Nash lecture audiences were asked to imagine that they
are the responder in the ultimatum game who has been offered $10 out of the $100. Almost all
teachers also assigned the version of the responder following the version of the proposer.
Example 7: The Ultimatum Game: The Responder (#25)
You and someone you do not know are to share $100. He makes you an offer and you can
either accept it or reject it.
If you reject it, neither of you will get anything. He offers you $10 (if you accept, he will get
17$90).
Do you accept the offer? Yes/No
A surprisingly high proportion of subjects, 63% , “accepted” the offer. Remarkably, 95%
of those who offered 0 − 10 in the previous question, accepted the $10 as opposed to only 53%
of those who offered an equal split.
Is there a difference in response time between those who accept and those who reject the
$10 ? The RT’s of 2620 members of the audiences at the Technion, Tilburg, LSE,
Georgetown, UBC and Sabanci universities were recorded in addition to those of 1080
students in 33 courses. Remarkably, not only was the median of the two groups identical but,
as Figure 7 shows, the RT distributions of those who accepted and those who rejected the offer
was almost identical.
Answer Nash Lectures MRT Courses MRT
2620 27 1080 20
Yes 63% 27 62% 20
No 37% 27 38% 20
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This result appears to conflict somewhat with the results reported by the fMRI experiments.
Sanfey, Riling, Aronson, Nysstrom and Cohen (2003) attributed acceptance of the lower offer
to the cognitive side of the brain while rejection was attributed to the emotional part of the
brain. One would expect that the response time of those who accepted the low offer would
therefore be higher but the distributions of those who accepted and those who rejected the offer
are amazingly similar which casts doubt on the conclusion reached from the fMRI results.
5. Results: The Allais Problem
The final example is a variant of the Allais Paradox taken from Tversky and Kahneman
(1979). Subjects were asked to respond to questions I and II:
Problem 8: The Allais Paradox (#39 and #40)
I
19Imagine you have to choose one of the following two lotteries :
Lottery A yields $4000 with probability 0.2 and $0 with probability 0.8.
Lottery B yields $3000 with probability 0.25 and $0 with probability 0.75.
Which lottery would you choose?
II
Imagine you have to choose one of the following two lotteries :
Lottery C yields $4000 with probability 0.8 and $0 with probability 0.2.
Lottery D yields $3000 with probability 1.
Which lottery would you choose ?
Students in 31 courses responded to these questions and it was recommended that teachers
present the Problem I first and Problem II second. Participants in the Nash lecture in York
University were asked to respond to the two questions in the same order but with several
questions in between. The results for the Nash lecture audience and the classes are presented
together in the table and in Figure 8. The results are very similar to the original results of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
The choice of lottery A clearly requires more time than the choice of B as does the choice
of C relative to D. The fact that the RT’s of C and D are lower than those of A and B must be
an outcome of the fact that Problem II was presented after Problem I so that the subjects were
already familiar with the problem.
In Problem II, the sure prize of 3000 seems to be the instinctive response; the choice of the
risky lottery 0.84000  0.80 requires calculation and deliberation. Thus, the distinction
between instinctive and cognitive choices can explain the large differences in RT between the
two choices.
In Problem I, the choice of 0.24000  0.80 is usually explained either by the
comparison of the expectations or by the procedure (described in Rubinstein (1988)) in which
the decision maker finds the probabilities to be similar and makes the choice according to the
decisive difference in the size of the prizes. The choice of 0.253000  0.750 is more
difficult to interpret. The differences in response time seem to indicate that the choice of
0.253000  0.750 was for many an outcome of reasonless choice.
20Kahneman  Tversky Lecture Audience and Classes MRT
In  95 n  1258 44s
A  0.24000  0.80 65% 62% 50s
B  0.253000  0.750 35% 38% 36s
II n  95 n  1168 23s
C  0.84000  0.20 20% 26% 32s
D  3000 80% 74% 20s
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6. Conclusion
I conclude by replying to potential criticisms of the approach suggested in this paper:
a) The method of data collection
The data is indeed very noisy and is blurred by the behavior of subjects who “choose”
without serious deliberation. There are also differences in server speed. Furthermore, subjects
differ in how fast they read and think. Indeed, this is the reason I do not advise conducting this
kind of research using a sample of less than several thousand. Here, the magic of a large
21sample gives us a clear picture of the relative time responses.
A standard criticism of survey experiments is that without monetary rewards behavior is
less realistic. However, in my experience there is only a non-qualitative difference between
survey results and results in experiments with monetary rewards (see also Camerer and
Hogarth (1999)). In any case, we are not interested here in the absolute distribution of
responses in real life problems (and note that even with real payments the experiment is still
far from a real life situation). Since we are only interested in the relative response times of the
different choices, the lack of real rewards should not have any impact.
b) Statistical tests
I believe that the results presented here are so persuasive that performing statistical tests
would not have any value beyond paying taxes to the orthodoxy. It is true that for certain
problems, not presented here, in which results exhibited only slight differences in response
times statistical tests are needed. However, I doubt that the results of such tests would be of
much interest unless the differences are large enough to make those tests redundant in any
case.
With that said, I yielded to the pressure of readers of earlier drafts and conducted the
standard Wilcoxon Two Sample Test.
Experiment Pair p − value
Zero Sum Game (#15) T,B 3.6  10−11
Successive Elimination of Strategies (#4) B,C 8  10−39
The Traveler’s Dilemma (#53) 295 − 9,300 1.3  10−23
Guess 2/3 of the Average (#1) A,B 2.8  10−9
B,C 2.6  10−8
Centipede Game (#33 ) 101,98 − 100 6.1  10−5
98 − 100,2 − 97 3.9  10−12
The Ultimatum game (#23) 50,0 − 14 . 3  10−16
The Ultimatum Game: A Responder (#25) Y,N 2.9  10−2
The Allais Paradox (#39 and #40) A,B 4.4  10−10
C,D 6.3  10−20
22c) The distinction between intuitive and cognitive choices
As mentioned earlier, the classification of choices was done intuitively. An alternative and
more formal approach would be to base such classification on other sources of information
such as the results of a survey in which subjects would be asked whether they consider a
choice to be instinctive or not. Of course, such an approach would have its own deficiencies.
In any case, the distinction between intuitive and cognitive was used here only as a suggestive
explanation for the huge differences in time response between actions.
Overall, I believe that the methodology used in this paper is a cheap and incisive tool for
understanding the process of reasoning involved in classical economic decision problems.
Furthermore, the results appear to be more clear-cut and less speculative than those obtained
recently by the fMRI research.
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